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Interstate Recognition of Adoptions:
On Jurisdiction, Full Faith and Credit, and the Kinds
of Challenges the Future May Bring
Mark Strasser*
I. INTRODUCTION

Two recent high-profile cases involving adoptions by same-sex
partners highlight the potential diHiculties that can arise when
fm1ilies composed of same-sex parents and their children cross state
lines. In Finstuen v. Crutcher, 1 the Tenth Circuit struck down an
Oklahoma law that precluded the state from recognizing both of a
child's same-sex parents, even when those parent-child relationships
had been established in other states in accord with local law. 2 In
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, both the Vermont Supreme Court3
and a Virginia appellate court 4 recognized that Vermont courts had
jurisdiction to decide the custody and visitation issues arising from
the dissolution of a Vermont civil union. 5 While the courts reached
the correct results in these cases, the cases themselves and the
underlying jurisprudence suggest that differing state practices may
both put children at risk and induce individuals to seek dissolutions
of their relationships and determinations of custody and visitation
rights prematurely.
States are required as a constitutional matter to give full faith and
credit to final adoption decrees from other states. 6 However,
recognition of adoptive status docs not afford as much protection as
one might think. There is ample room tor mischief to families even

• Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
I. 496 f.3d 1139 (lOth Cir. 2007).
2. ld. at 1141-42 (discussing OKLA. ST. AN:-;. Tit. 10, § 7502-1.4 (West 2007)).
3. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006).
4. Miller- Jenkins v. Miller- Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
5. 912 A.2d at 956; 637 S.E.2d at 332.
6. Hood v. McGhee, 237 U.S. 611, 614-15 (1915) (holding that Alabama must
recognize Louisiana adoption in action regarding inheritance of adopted children because of
the full Faith and Credit Clause); see U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
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when that recognition has been accorded, and the foreseeable
defensive measures that might be taken to prevent certain harms
from occurring might themselves be non -optimal for the f:m1ilics
involved. Because of the ever-increasing mobility of the population,
it is becoming even more important that states act in concert to
prevent individuals from gaming the system and imposing on their
children and ex-partners unnecessary and undeserved costs. 7
Interstate custody and visitation disputes are already complicated
enough/ and adding additional layers of complexity and
indeterminacy will result in increased litigation, instability, and
overall harm. Unless additional protective measures arc incorporated
into law either by Congress or by the courts, one can only expect
more protracted litigation and more harm to children arising from
these interstate disputes.
Part II of this Article explains that states must give full faith and
credit to adoption decrees issued by other states in accord with local
law, whether those adoptions involve children or adults. Part III
discusses the conditions under which states can modifY visitation
orders issued by other state courts in light of the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act and the Defense of Marriage Act. Finally,
Part IV offers a brief conclusion explaining that although Finstuen
and Miller-Jenkins are protective of the rights of same-sex parents,
they nonetheless illustrate some of the dangers faced by same-sex
parents and their children.
II. ADOPTION, CUSTODY, AND VISITATION IN INTERSTATE
DISPUTES

The Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes obligations on the
states with respect to how they must treat the judgments, acts, and
records of other states. 9 Recently, an Oklahoma law precluded state
officials from according full faith and credit to adoptions by same-sex
parents that had been validly performed in other states. 10 As the
Finstuen court recognized, there is no public policy exception
7. For example, the current system may create incentives to tile suit prematurely to
establish parental rights and obligations. Sec text f(,l!owing note 209 infra.
8. Cf Brown v. Brown, 847 S.W.2d 496,498 (Tenn. 1993) ("As dimrce bcc[amcl
more common and society more mobile, the volume and complexity of interstate child custody
decrees increased dramatically.").
9. See U.S. CoNST. art. IV,§ I, d. 3.
I 0. OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. I 0, § 7502-1.4 (West 2007).
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permitting states to refuse to recognize valid adoptions from other
states. 11 While same-sex parents can take some comfort in the
Finstuen decision, a variety of adoption-related issues will still have
to be resolved.

A. Full Faith and Credit and Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The htll Faith and Credit Clause reads: "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given to each State to the public Acts, Records and judicial
Proceedings of every other State. " 12 As the Supreme Court explained
in Estin Jl. Estin/' the clause "substituted a command for the earlier
principles of comity and thus basically altered the status of the States
as independent sovereigns." 14
Were there no Pull Faith and Credit Clause, a state could
consider its own public policy when deciding whether to credit
another state's judgment. Under the principles of comity, a state
might decide to credit the judgment of another state out of
deference or, perhaps, out of the belief that giving full faith and
credit to the judgment of a sister state might induce the latter to
reciprocate in a future case when the states' respective positions had
been reversed. 15 Nonetheless, the principles of comity permit a
forum to refuse to give credit to a foreign state's judgment if that
judgment violates an important public policy of the forum. 1('
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not afford states the
discretion to refuse to give full faith and credit to judgments validly
issued in other state courts 17-the states are not "free to ignore
obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of

ll. Finstuen v. Crutchcr,496 F3d 1139,1152-53 (lOth Cir. 2007).
12. U.S. Cm-lsT. art. IV,§ l.
13. Estin \'. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
14. Id. at 546 (citing Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 301, 302 ( 1942 )).
15. Cf Hilton v. (;uyot, !59 U.S. 113, 197 ( 1895) (noting a case in which "Vice
Chancellor Wood (afterwards Lord Hathcrlcv) reti1scd to give ctfect to a judgment in
personam of a court in I .ouisiana, which had declined to recognize the title of a mortgagee of
an English ship under the English law").
16. )atli: \.Accredited Suretv & Cas. Co., lnc., 294 F3d 584, 59! (4th Cir. 2002)
("\A J state can rdi1se, as Florida did, to recognize a jiwciHn judgment on the ground that it
conflicts with the public policy of that state." (citing Hilton, !59 U.S. at 163)).
17. Id. at 592 ("But neither a state nor a tedcral wurt can refuse to give tiill taith and
credit to the judgment of a state court because of disagreement with rhe public policv basis t(>r
that decision.").
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the others." 18 The clause effected a change in the status of the states,
making them "integral parts of a single nation throughout which a
remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right,
irrespective of the state of its origin. " 19
The effect of this change must not be minimized, since it means
that a state might be required to submit "to hostile policies reflected
in the judgment of another State. " 20 The Court has noted that "the
requirements of full faith and credit, so far as judgments are
concerned, are exacting. " 21 As the Court explained in Nevada v.
Hall, 22 "[a] judgment entered in one State must be respected in
another provided that the first State had jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter." 23 For example, when a state court with
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter issues a final
judgment in which money damages are awarded, that judgment is
enforceable, even if a different state would have treated the matter
differently and would have denied recovery. The validity of the claim
is not to be revisited by another state's court; 24 rather, the sole basis
upon which another state court might decide not to enforce such an
award would be if the court issuing the judgment lacked jurisdiction
over the parties or subject matter. 25
It might seem that because family matters involve such important
interests, the requirements of full faith and credit must be relaxed
where such matters are at issue, so that states can give eftect to their
considered public policies when deciding whether to enforce a sister
state's judgment in such a sensitive and important area. 26 The Full
Faith and Credit Clause, however, has been interpreted to take an

18. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 ( 1935 ).
19. Id.
20. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541,546 (1948).
21. Id. (citingWilliamsv. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942)).
22. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
23. Id.at42l.
24. Milwaukee County, 296 U.S. at 275 ("A cause of action on a judgment is different
from that upon which the judgment was entered. In a suit upon a money judgment for a civil
cause of action the validity of the claim upon which it was founded is not open to inquiry,
whatever its genesis.").
25. Id. ("Recovery upon [the judgment] can be resisted only on the grounds that the
court which rendered it was without jurisdiction." (citations omitted)).
26. Cf Stephen A. Newman, Human Cloning and the Substantive Due Process Riddle, 8
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J, 153, 166 (1998) ("The community has vital interests in defining the
basic institution of the family.").
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entirely different tack-the importance of the interests at stake
militates in favor of the finality of judgmcnts. 27 In Sherrer v. Sherrer,
the Court reasoned "[ t ]hat vital interests arc involved in divorce
litigation indicates to us that it is a matter of greater rather than
lesser importance that there should be a place to end such
litigation." 28 That way, marital status and the legitimacy of children
would not depend upon the jurisdiction in which an individual
happened to find herself. 29
While the Full Faith and Credit Clause limits the sovereignty of
states in that they are not free to refuse to enforce judgments validly
issued in other states on public policy grounds, the clause does not
impose analogous obligations when something other than a
judgment is at issue. The Supreme Court has recognized that states
retain their sovereignty when deciding whether to give effect to the
statutes of other states. Thus, the Court noted in Pacific Employers
Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission: 30
[T]hc very nature of the federal union of states, to which are
reserved some of the attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to
the full taith and credit clause [sic] as the means for compelling a
state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes
dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to
lcgislate. 31

While one state might decide to defer to another state's law in the
interest of comity, the forum state is not required to do so by the
full Faith and Credit Clause. The Court explained in Baker by
Thomas v. General Motors Corp. 32 that a distinction must be made
with respect to "the credit owed to laws (legislative measures and
common law) and to judgments." 33 A state need not ignore its own
public policy determination and defer to the laws of another state,

27. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 356 (1948).
28. Id. at 356.
29. Sec Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1948) ("For a person domiciled in one
State should not be allowed to suffer the penalties of bigamy for living outside the State with
the only one which the State of his domicile recognizes as his lawful wife. And children born of
the only marriage which is lawful in the State of his domicile should not carry the stigma of
bastardy when they move elsewhere.").
30. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
31. Id. at 501.
32. 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
33. Id. at 232.
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even when those laws contradict the public policy of the enforcing
state. 34 However, the state must yield to a judgment of another state
court if the latter court had jurisdiction to issue that judgment.'"
Thus, the Baker Court summarized the existing jurisprudence by
suggesting that while a "court may be guided by the forum State's
'public policy' in determining the law applicable to a controversy," 3 ('
the Constitution does not support a "roving 'public policy
exception' to the full faith and credit due judgments. " 37 Where there
has been a valid, final adoption in one state, sister states will not be
permitted to refuse to recognize that judgment.

B. Limitations on Who Can Be a Parent
Some states do not permit those with a same-sex orientation to
adopt children. 38 Even an individual whose parenting skills are
"exemplary" might be precluded from adopting a child because he
or she is in a romantic relationship with a same-sex partner. 39 Most
states do not impose such a restriction, however, and instead permit
individuals to adopt singly, regardless of their sexual orientation. 40
An individual who adopts might nonetheless be living with
another adult in a romantic relationship. States differ with respect to
whether each member of a non-marital couple is permitted to
establish a legally recognized relationship with the child that they
34. Id. ("The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel 'a state to substitlltc the
statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is
competent to legislate."' (quoting Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 306 U.S. at 501; citing Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,818-819 (1985))).
35. Id. at 233 ("Regarding judgments, however, the tull faith and credit obligation is
exacting. A final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatorv authoritv over
the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualities for recognition throughout
the land.").
36. Id. (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,421-24 (1979)).
37. Id. (citing Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541,546 (1948)).
38. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 63.042(3) (2003) ("No person eligible to adopt under
this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual."). Actually, the Florida statute has been
construed to be based on sexual activity rather than sexual orientation. Sec Mark Strasser,
Lan,rence, Lofton, and Reasoned Judgment: On Who Can Adopt and Why, 18 ST. THO,\!AS L.
REv. 473, 477 (2005) (discussing the construction of the florida statute).
39. See Loti:on v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & l:'J.mily Scn•s., 358 !:'.3d 804, 807-08
(11th Cir. 2004).
40. See Mark Strasser, Adoption, Best Interests, and the Comtitution: On Rational Basis
Scrutiny and the Avoidance of Absurd Results, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 297, 298 (2003) ("As a
general matter, singles can adopt and, in most but not all states, gays and lesbians can adopt as
single adults.").
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both arc raising. 41 For example, one member of a same-sex couple
might have adopted a child, had a child in a heterosexual
relationship, or made use of advanced reproductive techniques to
produce a child. In some states, that individual's same-sex partner
would be allowed to adopt that child via a second-parent adoption, 42
so that both adults would be recognized as the legal parents of that
child.
Affording legal recognition to the second parent's relationship
with a child might not have much effect on that child's day-to-day
routine-whether or not both adults were legally recognized as the
child's parents, one parent might transport the child to and from
school while the other parent might take the child to the doctor.
However, according that recognition might have significant effects
on the family's finances. For example, the second parent might be
the only parent working outside of the home, and the legal
recognition of the parent-child relationship might permit that parent
to list the child as a dependent entitled to employer-provided
medical insurance. 43 According that recognition might also affect the
second parent's willingness to invest emotionally in the child,44 since

41. Compare Vr. STAT. A:\N. tit. !SA,§ 1-102 (b) (2007) ("If a family unit consists of
a parent and the: parent's partner, and adoption is in the best interest of the child, the partner
of .1 parent may adopt a child of the parent. Termination of the parent's parental rights is
unnecessary in an adoption under this subsection.") with LA. CHILD CODE AN:-.1. art. 1198
( 1992) ("A single person, eighteen years or older, or a married couple jointly may petition to
adopt a child through an agency."). This statute has been interpreted to preclude two
unnurricd individuals t(mn jointly adopting a child. See Adoption of Meaux, 417 So.2d 522,
523 (La. App. 1982) ("As two single persons jointly petitioning to become the adoptive
parents, they arc not 'a single person' under the statute. Therefore, the statute does not
authorize petitioners to jointly adopt their natural child.").
42. Sec Christopher Colorado, Tying the Braid of Second-Parent Adoptions-Where Due
l'roas.r Mati Equal Protection, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1425, 1432-33 (2005) ("A secondp.lrent adoption is a 'procedure that allows a same-sex co-parent to adopt his or her partner's
biological or adopted child.' Once the second-parent adoption is completed, the birth parent
and the adopter parent have equivalent rights vis-a-vis the child." (quoting ]OA:\ HEIFETZ
HOI.l.Il\:GER, ADOPT!0:-.1 LAW AND PRACTICE,§ 3.06[6] 3-57 (2004); citing Julie Shapiro, A
Lc.rbimt-Ceutercd Critique of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 17, 26
( 1999))).
43. Sa Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Mass. 1993) (permitting secondp.uc:nt .1doption would make child eligible tor coverage under partner's insurance policy).
44. Sec Deborah L. forman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Parents in the Wake of
Gav MarritlJfC, CiFil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 46 B.C. L. REV. 1, 56 (2004)
("Partners whose rights arc vulnerable might retrain from fully assuming their parental role, for
fear that their rights could be: easily abrogated by a move elsewhere. In addition, uncertainty
puts the child at risk of abandonment by the partner, without repercussions.").
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she could be confident that her relationship with the child would
continue even if her relationship with her adult partner were to end
through death or dissolution.

1. In reAdoption ofM.C.D.
Some states do not recognize second-parent adoptions, bendits
that might accrue from such recognition notwithstanding. 4 " For
example, while Oklahoma allows single individuals to adopt and
married individuals to adopt, 46 state case law suggests that each
member of a non-marital couple will not be permitted to adopt the
same child. In In reAdoption of M.C.D., 47 an Oklahoma appellate
court addressed whether two divorcing individuals could each adopt
the child who had been living with them. The trial court had
permitted each adult to adopt the child at issue, and the husband
had appealed the trial court's decision permitting his soon-to-be exwife to become the child's legally recognized mother. 48
In reversing the trial court,49 the appellate court made clear that
the adoptions at issue were not permitted under local law. However,
the court was not entirely clear as to whether it was only suggesting
that the kind of adoption before it could not take place or, instead,
whether, as a general matter, two unmarried adults would be

45. See Benjamin G. Ledsham, Note, Means to Legitimate Ends: Same-Sex Marria"qe
through the Lens of Illegitimacy-Based Discriminl!tion, 28 CAlUJOZO L. REV. 2373, 2375
n.l7 (2007) ("Only one quarter of states recognize second-parent adoptions, either by explicit
legislation or by judicial decisions interpreting general adoption statutes." (citing Lvnn D.
Wardle, A Critical AnaZvsis of Interstate Recognition of LesBiGay Adoptions, 3 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 561,567 (2005))).
46. See 10 OKLA. STAT. A:-.:N. tit. l 0, § 7503-l.l (West 2007).
The following persons are eligible to adopt a child:
1. A husband and wife jointly if both spouses arc at least twenty-one (21) years of
age;
2. Either the husband or wife if the other spouse is a parent or a relative of the child;
3. An unmarried person who is at least twenty-one (21) years of age; or
4. A married person at least twenty-one (21) years of age who is legally separated
!rom the other spouse.
Id. This statute has been strictly construed to preclude two divorcing individuals !rom
adopting the same child. See In reAdoption of M.C.D., 42 P.3d 873, 881-82 (Okla. Ci\'.
App. 20lH ).
47. 42 P.3d 873 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001 ).
48. I d. at 878 ("Husband's second contention is the trial court erred as a matter of law
by ordering a joint adoption by nvo unmarried people.").
49. Id. at 885 ("The order granting both Husband's and Wife's petitions to adopt
M.C.D. arc reversed and remanded tor redetermination.").
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precluded from each adopting the same child. On one hand, the
appellate court indicated that the adoption statute must be strictly
construed, 50 which suggests that Oklahoma law does not permit
second-parent adoptions. 51 On the other hand, however, when
justifYing its decision, the court offered a rationale that differentiated
the situation in M.C.D. from the context in which second-parent
adoption requests often occur. The court wrote:
The requested adoption by two divorcing persons fails to fit within
any of the statutory categories of those eligible to adopt. It
contravenes the above-stated purpose of the Oklahoma Adoption
Act that children should be placed in stable, permanent loving
families. The "family" in the instant case is divided by divorce and
Husband and Wife clearly have an antagonistic and adversarial
relationship. It is therefore not stable, permanent or loving as a
family "unit," despite how stable or loving Husband and Wife may
be individually. 52
The M. C. D. court emphasized that by permitting both of these
individuals to adopt the child, the state would not be promoting its
goal of placing children in stable, loving families because the adults
would be living in different residences and would be antagonistic
toward each other. Yet, this is an important difference between the
situation in M.C.D. and the situation in the paradigmatic case
involving second-parent adoptions where the adults are living
together in a harmonious home in which the child is already
thriving.
A separate issue is whether permitting the adoptions in M. C. D.
would have promoted the best interests of the child. It may be that
the child would have been better off having been adopted by each
member of the divorcing couple, since that would have assured
continued contact with each adult. Given the antagonism between

50. Id. at 882 ("Strict construction of the statute requires that we reverse the order
granting both petitions to adopt.").
51. See hnstucn v. Crutcher, 496 !:'.3d 1139, 1149 (lOth Cir. 2007) ("The state court
of civil appeals held that the statute, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7503-1.1 (West 2007),
categorically denies unmarried couples eligibility to adopt a child, even though it permits single
individuals to adopt." (citing M.C.D., 42 P.3d at 878, 881~82 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001))). Of
course, the Fimtueu court itself pointed out that its interpretation was not binding. I d. at 1149
n.7 ("We observe, of course, that we 'lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state
legislation,' and as such our interpretation docs not bind Oklahoma courts.") (citing United
States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 ( 1971) (citation omitted))).
52. M.C.D., 42 P.3d at 881.
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the adults, neither of them seemed likely to permit continued
contact with the other unless ordered to do so by the court, and
denying the child's contact with either of them might have been
harmful. 53 Or, it might be that granting both adoptions would be
harmful to the child precisely because each parent could use the child
to get back at the f(xmer spouse. In any event, the point is not to
debate whether the court's decision promoted the interests of the
child but merely to note that there are grounds fiJr reading M.C.D.
narrowly so that the Oklahoma statute would not have to be read as
precluding second-parent adoption.

2. Finstuen v. Crutcher
At issue in Finstuen v. Crutcherq was not the state's refusal to
permit non-marital couples to adopt but, instead, a different
Oklahoma statute that precluded the state from recognizing
adoptions performed in other states where both parents were of the
same sex. In this case, three same-sex couples and their adopted
children brought suit against the state of Oklahoma to have the
adoption law struck down. Only one of the couples was f(mnd to
have standing betore the court, although each t~1111ily \vas harmed by
the law. 55
The law at issue might have serious consequences. Suppose, f(Jr
example, that two women were in a long-term relationship in
California. One gave birth to a child after having been artificially
inseminated, and the other availed herself of the second-parent
adoption option permitted under locallaw. 56 They lived in Calif(xnia
for several years but decided to move to Oklahoma to take advantage
of an employment opportunity. The Oklahoma law would preclude
recognition of the relationship between the adoptive parent and the
child, notwithstanding that the relationship had already existed in
Calif(m1ia for several years both in law and in fact.
When analyzing the issues implicated in Finstuen, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals cited to the Supreme Court's decision in
S3. ld . .lt ~~6 (Hansen, C.)., dissenting) ("If Wife is not allowed to adopt M.C:.D.,
C.D.M.D. will luvc a mother while M.C.D. will not, <liH.i M.C.D. will be excluded ti·om
C.D.M.D.'s visitations with Wife.").
S4. 4'161'.3d 113'1.
S5. Sec id. at 1141-43.
56. Sec Sharon S. \'. Super. Ct., 73 !'.3d 554 (Cal. 2003) (holding that second-parent
adoption is an option tilr same-sex couples); cf Fimtucu, 4'16 !'.3d at I 142.
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Baker f(x the proposition that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does
not include a public policy exception for the credit due judgments, 57
and then held that "final adoption orders and decrees are judgments
that are entitled to recognition by all other states under the Full
Faith and Credit Clausc." 58 The court's decision was unsurprisingas the court itself noted, "many courts-including Oklahoma's
Supreme Court-have determined that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause applies to valid adoption decrees from other states. " 59 Indeed,
the Oklahoma Attorney General had suggested that Oklahoma was
required to give full faith and credit to valid adoptions from other
jurisdictions, even if that meant recognizing that a particular child
had two fathers. 60 Perhaps believing that the Attorney General was in
error or wishing to have the issue settled by the courts, the
Oklahoma Legislature passed the law at issue in Finstuen one month
after the Oklahoma State Department of Health had issued a new
birth certificate that named two men as the parents of the same

57. Fiwtum, 496 F.3d .11 1152 (citing Baker by Thomas\'. Gen. Motors Corp., 522
U.S 222,233 (199ii)).
5X. !d. at 1156.
59. !d. at 1155. The overwhelming view in the secondary literature is that states cannot
refuse to recognize such adoptions from other states. See also Barbara J. Cox, Adoptions by
Lesbian and ( ;ay l'armts Must Be Recr~qnized by Sister States Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause De.~pitc Anti-Marria,qe Statutes That Discriminate Against Same-Sex Coupln, 31 CAP.
U. L. REV. 751, 752-53 (2003) ("[A] valid, tina! adoption decree rendered in one state
establishing a parent-child relationship between the adoptive parcnt(s) and the adoptive
child(ren) must be recognized in every other state as equally valid as an adoption decree
rendered in that other state."); Wardle, supra note 45, at 575 ("Many family law scholars agree
with the conventional wisdom that states must recognize sister-state adoptions."); Ralph U.
Whitten, Choice of Lall', Jurisdictirm, and Judgment Issues in Iuterstate Adoption Ctues, 31 CAP.
U. L. REV. X03, X41 (2003) ("There is no question that states must give effect to the valid
adoption judgments of other states.").
60. Fiustuen, 4961:'.3d at 1142 ("Mr. Greg Hampel and Mr. Ed Swaya are residents of
Washington, where they jointly adopted child V in 2002 .... Ati:er V's adoption, Mr. Hampel
and Mr. Swaya requested that OSDH issue a new birth certificate fix V. OSDH did so on July
7, 2003, but named onlv Mr. Hampel as V's parent. Mr. Hampel and Mr. Swaya contested
that action, prompting OSDH to seck an opinion from the Oklahoma attorney general as to
whether it must fultill the request to list both bthers on the birth ccrtiticate. The attorncv
gcner.1l opined that the lJ .S. Constitution's Full Faith .md Credit Cl.lusc required Oklahoma
to recognize any validly issued out~ot~statc adoption decree.").
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child. 61 The Tenth Circuit made clear that the Oklahoma Attorney
General's analysis had been correct. 62
a. The Hampel-Swaya family: afraid to cross state lines. A state's
refusal to recognize an adoption poses serious risks. For example,
two of the Finstuen plaintiffs, Greg Hampel and Ed Swaya, had
entered into an open adoption agreement with the biological mother
of the child, agreeing to bring the child to Oklahoma periodically so
that the mother could see how the child was progressing. 63 The
adoptive couple feared that if there were a medical emergency in
which parental consent was required before a procedure could be
performed, the state's announced policy of refusing to recognize the
parental rights of both members of the same-sex couple could result
in harm to their child. 64 If one of the parents were unable to make a
decision because he, too, had been hurt in the automobile accident,
the other parent's medical authorization might not be accepted as
valid.
Indeed, one could imagine a scenario in which parental
permission for a medical procedure was required and the hospital
refused to accept either parent's authorization, instead choosing to
wait until a court determined which parent's authority would be
recognized by the state. Such an action might be taken were there a
law or policy requiring that ( l) the child's parent must first be
identified, and then (2) that parent would be apprised of all the
relevant information so that an informed medical decision could be
made, and (3) the decision would be made. Because it might be
unclear which adult in the same-sex couple was the "parent" and
thus ( l) could not be performed without a legal determination of
parentage, the hospital administrator might believe that her hands
were tied until a court had identified the child's parent.
In a situation where one of the same-sex partners was a biological
parent and the other subsequently adopted, the hospital would

61. See id. at 1142 ("OSDH subsequently issm:d V a new birth ccrtitic.lte 1uming both
men as parents. The state legislature responded one month later by enacting the adoption
amendment.").
62. See id. at 1141-42 ("Because the Oklahoma statute at issue categorically rejects a
class of out-of-state adoption decrees, it violates the l:'ull Faith and Credit Clause. We
therefore aftirm the order and judgment of the district court declaring the statute
unconstitutional .... ").
63. Id. at 1142.
64. Id. at 1144.
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presumably recognize the biological parent's authority. Where one of
the partners had adopted before the other, the hospital would
presumably recognize the first parent's authority. But if both parents
had adopted at the same time, the hospital might not know whose
rights to recognize. Perhaps the hospital would say that as long as
each member of the couple gave informed consent to the procedure
it would not matter who was recognized by the state as the legal
parent and thus the relevant procedure could be performed without
waiting for a legal determination of parentage. However, it is not at
all clear that the relevant decision-makers would adopt this
procedure rather than say that a court would have to declare the
"true" parent before the non-emergency procedure could be
performed. Any delay might mean that a child would undergo
needless pain and suffering.
While recognizing that a situation might occur in which it would
be important to establish who was a parent and that harm might
result were the statute enforced, the court in Finstuen nonetheless
suggested that the harm was merely hypothetical rather than actual
and thus that the two men did not have standing to challenge the
law. 65 Yet, even if one brackets the medical nightmare in which there
is a delay until the "real" parent is identified, it should be clear that
the Oklahoma law harmed all of the concerned parties. The fathers
in Finstuen suggested that they would have brought their child to
Oklahoma to see the child's biological mother, but had refrained
from doing so out of fear that something might happen that would
require Oklahoma to make a parentage determination. 66 Whether or
not the potential harm was sufficiently concrete to confer standing
on the parties, an important point is that the parties were acting
diflCrently to avoid some of the potential difficulties that might arise,
and the change in behavior might have been detrimental to the
child, the biological mother, and the fathers themselves.
It is not diftl.cult to imagine that other families involving children
and same-sex parents might be reluctant to go to Oklahoma to visit
extended family members for some of the same reasons that these
fathers had articulated, even though that would mean that a child
65. Sec id. ("Although a medical emergency might create a scenario in which parental
consent is required, such a situation is merely hypothetical, as opposed to an actual or
impending contact with Oklahoma authorities that could jeopardize the rights of any member
of the Hampei-Swaya bmilv.").
66. Id.

1821

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2008

might have more difficulty in establishing and maintammg
relationships with cousins, grandparents, and other extended family
members. Such a law would undermine rather than promote family
values, which suggests that the law is not rationally related to
promote a legitimate state interest. After all, it is not as if such a law
would deter same-sex parents from establishing legal relationships
with their children. Nor would such a law deter parents from living
with their children/ 7 although such a law might decrease the
likelihood that they would have rich and enduring relationships with
their Oklahoma relatives.
b. The Finstuen-Magro family: afraid to act as a parent. The
Oklahoma statute might also have important implications for families
living in the state. Consider the Finstuen-Magro family, who resided
in Oklahoma. 68 Anne Magro was the biological mother of the
couple's children, so her parental rights were not jeopardized by the
statute. 69 However, Heather Finstuen, who had adopted the
children, feared "having her parent-child relationship invalidated,
and this fear cause[ d] her to avoid signing forms and papers-such as
school permission slips or medical releases-that could trigger a
question about her legitimacy as a parent. " 70 As if this increased
anxiety was not enough of a burden, Finstuen also noted that the
children were "fearful due to her uncertain parental status, and that
they ha[ d] become more 'clingy' and [we Jre 'increasingly concerned
about when and whether she w[ ould] come home. "' 71 The very
existence of the statute imposed psychological burdens on the entire
family.
Testimony about the psychological effects notwithstanding, the
Finstuen court was unconvinced that the statute imposed actual
harms on the family. The court noted that finstuen had "recite[ d]
no encounter with any public or private official in which her
authority as a parent was questioned. " 72 Yet, one infers, her
consistent refusal to bring any attention to her role as a parent was

67. See Whitten, mpra note 59, at 850 ("Allowing states to reject adoption 11\' same·sex
partners in other states will not prevent children from living with such partners, nor \\'ill it
prevent the parties from intiJrmally standing in the relationship of parent and child.").
68. Fimtucn, 496 !:'.3d at 1142.
69. I d. at 1144-45
70. Id. at 1145.
71. !d.
72. Id.
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likely the reason that she did not encounter officials questioning her
parental status. Further, given how the children reacted, they too
might have been reluctant to treat her as a parent in public for fear
that their doing so would have negative results.
·while the court may have been correct that Finstuen had not
encountered an official who questioned her authority as a parent,
this should not be thought to establish that the statute had had no
adverse efiects on the family. On the contrary, the most plausible
assessment would be that all members of the family were adversely
aftccted by the ever-present threat of the state's refusing to recognize
Finstuen's parental status.
Ironically, the court implicitly suggested that Finstuen should
not have adopted a policy of maintaining a low profile. The court
noted that Finstuen had not "established that the amendment
create[ d] an actual, imminent threat to her rights as a parent or the
rights of her adopted children, because she [was] not presently
seeking to enforce any particular right before Oklahoma
authorities. " 73 Of course, she probably feared trying to enforce her
rights precisely because she did not know what would happen either
to the right that might be put at issue or to any other rights she
might have. The court held that neither Heather Finstuen nor Anne
Magro had standing to challenge the Oklahoma statute. 74
c. The Doel family: hospital privileges. Although all the families
involved in the suit were harmed by the Oklahoma statute, the
Finstuen court held that only two plaintiffs-Jennifer and Lucy
Doel-had sufJered the type of harm that could confer standing. The
Doels had requested the Oklahoma State Department of Health to
issue a new birth certificate that included both the first adoptive
mother's name-Lucy Dod-and the second adoptive mother's
name-Jennifer Doel 75-as the child's parents. 76 That request was
refused. 77 Also, when the child had been brought to the emergency
room, the Doels had been told that only Lucy Doel could
accompany the child. 78

n.

Id.
74. Id.
75. Seeid.atl142.
76. Id. at 1145.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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Once standing was established, the court quickly dispensed with
the State's arguments in support of the law. For example, the State
had argued that the amendment only precluded the recognition of
adoptions by same-sex parents where the adoptions had occurred in
a single proceeding. 79 The State thereby suggested that the statute
would not preclude recognition of the Doe! adoptions, which
involved two different proceedings occurring six months apart. 80
However, the court noted that there was "absolutely nothing in the
record suggesting that the Oklahoma legislature would find same-sex
adoptions more acceptable if they occurred one parent at a time,
rather than by both parents at the same time. " 8 t Instead, the court
reasoned that the "public policy codified by the adoption
amendment was plainly meant to prevent recognition of adoptions
by same-sex couples. " 82 Lest there be any doubt, the court explained
that the "plain language of the statute bars recognition of the legal
act of adoption generally, as opposed to merely barring the
recognition of a subcategory of adoption proceedings involving both
parents in a single proceeding. " 83 This the State simply could not do.
The State offered another argument that would have had tarreaching consequences, if accepted by the court. Essentially, the
State argued that there was "no constitutional obligation to
recognize California's adjudication of the Doels' adoption because
no Oklahoma official was a party to the California adoption, and
therefore the California court ordering the adoption had no personal
jurisdiction over any Oklahoma oflicial to enforce the order against
such an official. " 84 However, this would mean that any adoption
finalized in one state that violated an important public policy of the
forum state would be subject to non-recognition unless a public
official of the forum state had been a party to the adoption. The
court noted that those seeking to have another state's final adoption

79. Id. at 1147-48 ("OSDH argues that the adoption amendment applies only to an
adoption by a same-sex couple that occurs in a single proceeding.").
80. Id. at 1142.
81. Id. at 1149.
82. Id. at 1148.
83. Id. at 1149.
84. Id. at 1154-55. But see Whitten, supra note 59, at 844 ("It should also be noted
that a judgment in an action to determine status will also bind non-parties to the action,
subject to certain exceptions. (E.g.,] ... [T]he natural father of a child will not be bound
unless ... [he is] afforded an opportunity to be a party to the action.").
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decree given fi..lll faith and credit by Oklahoma are not seeking "to
enforce their adoption order against ... the state of Oklahoma as a
matter of claim or issue preclusion," 85 but instead are merely seeking
to enforce Oklahoma rights under Oklahoma law, given the State's
obligation to recognize a sister state's judgment. 86 Had the court
accepted the State's argument, full faith and credit guarantees would
have been undermined significantly, both with respect to adoption
decrees in particular and with respect to judgments from other states
more generally.
The Finstuen court noted that "although the Full Faith and
Credit Clause applies unequivocally to the judgments of sister states,
it applies \Vith less force to their statutory laws. " 87 Oklahoma tried to
support the constitutionality of its refusal to give credit to another
state's adoption decree by arguing that forcing it to recognize the
adoption would "be tantamount to giving the sister state control
over the dTect of its judgment in Oklahoma" 88 because "the
recognition of adoptive status in Oklahoma would extend the gamut
of rights and responsibilities to the parents and child of the adoption
order, including the right of a child to inherit from his
parents . . . ." 89 The State further argued that "inheritance is an
Oklahoma property right which California courts lack the power to
confer. " 90
In rejecting Oklahoma's argument, the Finstuen court suggested
that the State had "improperly conf1ate[ d] Oklahoma's obligation to
give full faith and credit to a sister state's judgment with its authority
to apply its own state laws in deciding what state-specific rights and
responsibilities flow from that judgment." 91 Oklahoma was required
by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize the adoption decree
from another state, but a separate question to be determined under
Oklahoma law was the eflect of the adoption, such as inheritance

85. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1155 (emphasis in original).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1152 (footnote and citation omitted).
88. Id. at 1153.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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rights of adoptive children. 92 Nevertheless, the court did not explore
the ramifications of the limitations on the State's ability to make
distinctions within local law with respect to the benefits to which
adoptive children or parents might be entitled. 93
C. Adult Adoptions

The Finstuen court's distinction between whether an adoption
will be recognized and whether the adopted individual will be
entitled to particular benefits has a long pedigree. These issues have
been litigated both within and across state lines, and the basic
distinctions are well established.Y4
Consider, for example, adult adoption, that is, the adoption of
one adult by another adult. Some jurisdictions have very permissive
policies with respect to adult adoption, whereas others impose severe
restrictions limiting the kinds of adult adoptions that can occur
within
the
jurisdiction. 95
Variations
among
the
states

92. See id. at 1154 ("Okbhoma continues to exercise authority over the manner in
which adoptive relationships should be cntorccd in Oklahoma and the rights and obligations in
Oklahoma tlowing trom an adoptive relationship.").
93. for further discussion of this point, sec infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 87-93 and inji·a notes 95-126 and accompanying text
(distinguishing between whether the valid adoption would be recognized and whether the
adoptee would be entitled to particular benctits under local law).
95. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.010 (2008) ("Any person may be adopted."),
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-734(a) (West 2004) ("Any person eighteen years of age or
older may, by written agreement with another person at least eighteen years of age but
younger than himself or herselt~ unless the other person is his or her wite, husband, brother,
sister, uncle or aunt of the whole or half blood, adopt the other person as his or her child,
provided the written agreement shall be approved by the court of probate ti.1r the district in
which the adopting parent resides or, if the adopting parent is not an inhabitant of this state,
tor the district in which the adopted person resides."), !:'LA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042( I) (2003)
("Anv person, a minor or an adult, may be adopted."), with ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 14-810l(A)
(2005) ("Any adult person may adopt another adult person who is a stepchild, niece, nephew,
cousin or grandchild of the adopting person, by an agreement of adoption approved bv a
decree of adoption of the court in the county in which either the person adopting or the
person adopted resides. A foster parent may adopt an adult who was placed in his care when
the adult was a juvenile if the foster parent has maintained a continuous t:m1ilial relationship
with that person t<x tive or more years."), and OHIO REV. CODE§ 3107.02 (B) (200R) ("An
adult may be adopted under any of the f{J!Iowing conditions: (I) If the adult is totally and
permanently disabled; (2) If the adult is determined to be a mentally retarded person as
detincd in section 5123.0 I of the Revised Code; ( 3) If the adult had established a child-t<>stcr
caregiver or child-stepparent relationship with the petitioners as a minor, and the adult
consents to the adoption; (4) If the adult was, at the time of the adult's eighteenth birthdav, in
the permanent custody of a public children services agency or a private child placing agency,
and the adult consents to the adoption.").
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notwithstanding, the important point is that a valid adoption, even
of an adult, must be given full faith and credit in another state.
However, it is less clear what limitations are imposed on the states
with respect to the kinds of lines that can be drawn when states
distinguish among adoptees, affording particular benefits to some
but not others.
1. Why adopt another adult?
One adult might adopt another adult f(x any number of reasons.
It may be because the adopter has had a parent-child relationship
with the adoptee f()r a long time but never formally adopted the
individual because of legal impediments. Or, the adopter might wish
to secure or protect inheritance rights fix the adoptee or the
adoptee's children.
Suppose that Smith marries White, who has a child, John, from a
previous relationship. Smith has a wonderful relationship with John
and would like to adopt him. However, John's father has not
relinquished his parental rights. If John's father dies atter John has
reached maturity, Smith might wish to formalize the parent-child
relationship that has existed in fact for a long time and thus might
seek to adopt John, notwithstanding John's having reached
adulthood.% Indeed, John may not only have reached adulthood but
may in addition have a wife and children.Y 7
Or, it may be that one adult is adopting another because the
former wants to assure that the latter is able to receive an
inheritance. That might be because the individuals themselves have a

96. Cf In rc Estate of Brittin, 664 N.E.2d 687, 688 (Ill. App. 1996) ("The facts are
undisputed. The record reveals that when William Eugene was about three years of age, his
mother, Estelle Willet, married the decedent, Stephen Glenn Brittin. From age three, Stephen
and Estelle raised William as their son. The couple had one natural child, Mary Ann Buckman,
respondent herein. Estelle Willet Brittin died on july 28, 1975. Shortly thcrcati:er, on October
20, 1976, Stephen adopted vVilliam in an adult adoption proceeding in St. Clair County.
William was 46 years old at the time of the adoption and had five children, petitioners
herein."); see also l'irst Nat'l Bank v. Mott, 133 So. 78,79 (Fla. 1931) ("It appears that under
the laws of Connecticut Samuel E. Doane and his wit<: in that state f(mnally adopted Mac J.
Mott, a married woman, who, though then living in her own home, had previously resided
with the Doanes as a member of the t:unily.").
97. Sec, eB., !11 re Estate ofl;riswold, 354 A.2d 717,723-24 (Morris County Ct. 1976)
(discussing the adoption of a t<>rty-one year old man who had three children of his own).
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romantic relationship and the adopter wants to provide for his or her
loved one. 98
There are several different scenarios in which a desire to provide
for a romantic partner might lead to an adoption. In In re Adoption
of Adult Anonymous, 99 a man was adopted by his male lover. The
adoptee had feared that unless he established a father-son
relationship with his partner, his family would interfere with his
attempts to provide for that individual. 100 At issue here was not a
desire to have the adoptee inherit from someone else, but merely the
desire to protect the individual's right to dispose of his own property
as he desired. Of course, depending upon the state, one individual
adopting another would have certain implications for the
relationship. For example, in In re Adoption of Swanson, 101 the
Delaware Supreme Court discussed the implications of an adult
adoption in that state. In this case, one man wanted to adopt his
same-sex partner "to facilitate their estate planning," to "prevent
collateral claims on their respective estates from remote family
members, and to obtain the reduced inheritance tax rate which
natural and adopted children enjoy under Delaware law. " 102 The
Delaware Supreme Court approved the adoption, 103 noting that most
jurisdictions permitting adult adoptions "recognize that adult
adoptions for the purpose of creating inheritance rights are valid." 104
However, the Swanson court issued a warning that should be
considered whenever individuals think about whether to adopt a
romantic partner, namely, that the crime of incest includes "sexual
intercourse between a parent and child 'without regard to .
relationships by adoption."' 105 Thus, the court warned that an
98. See, e.g., J.P. Morgan Chase Bank v. Hickey, No. NC 04-0350, 2006 WL 20807, at
*2 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2006) ("Carder never married, but months before his death and years ati:cr
his father's death, he adopted his companion, Hickey, who was an adult at the date of
adoption.").
99. 435 N.Y.S.2d 527 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981).
100. See id. at 528 ("[T]he adoptee testified that his family did not approve of the
relationship, and he apparently feared that attempts might be made to set aside property
arrangements between the parties if they were not legally adoptive father and adopted son.").
101. 623 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1993).
102. Id. at 1096.
103. Id. at 1099 ("The Family Court is directed to issue an appropriate decree of
adoption.").
104. Id. at 1097.
105. Id. at 1099 (citing DEL. CODE A.'-.:N. tit. 11, § 766(b) (2008)). But see In re Adult
Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198, 201 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) ("Incest is only a makeweight

1828

1809]

Interstate Recognition of Adoptions

individual who had sexual relations with the adult whom he had
adopted would be open to prosecution for violating the incest
laws. 106
Suppose that an adult adoption occurs in one state and an estate
must be administered in another. This situation implicates two
issues: whether the forum state will recognize the adoption and, if
so, whether the adoptee will be allowed to inherit. As a general
matter, states have recognized adult adoptions validly pedixmed in
other states. As the Ohio Supreme Court explained, "The status of
adoption created by the law of the state of New York will be given
the same eHect in Ohio as is given by Ohio to the status of adoption
as created by its own law." 107
This means that even if the adoption could not have occurred
locally, it will be given full faith and credit if it was performed in
accord with the law of the state where the adoption took place. In
Delaney v. First National Bank in Albuquerque, 108 the New Mexico
Supreme Court addressed the legal effect of an adult adoption
performed in Colorado. Because the adopting adult and the adult
adoptee were only thirteen years apart, the adoption would not have
been permitted under New Mexico law, even though it was
permitted under Colorado law. 109 The New Mexico Supreme Court
explained that
the tact that a judgment entered by a foreign court could not have
been entered by a New Mexico court, because it would have
offended the public policy of New Mexico, \\ill not permit the

issue in this case. The New York incest statute is limited and does not proscribe a relationship
such as here.").
106. Swan.ron, 623 A.2d at 1099.
107. Barrett\'. Delmore, 54 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ohio 1944). The court noted that its
position is in accord with that suggested by the American Law Institute. Id. at 792 ("The
American Law Institute has stated the rule as follows: 'The status of adoption, created b\' the
law of a state haYing jurisdiction to create it, will be giYen the same effect in another state as is
giYen by the latter state to the status of adoption when created by its own law."' (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAW 209, § 143 (1934))).
108. 386 P.2d 711 (N.M. 1963).
109. Id. at 714. At the time of the adoption of Celia Thompson by Paul Delaney in
Colorado, New Mexico had a statute that permitted the adoption of an unmarried adult by an
adult person, provided the person adopting was at least twenty years older than the person
adopted. N.M. STAT.§ 22-2-13 (1953). Since Paul Delaney was only thirteen years older than
Celia Thompson, who was twenty-five years of age at the time, the adoption could not have
been accomplished in New Mexico.
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courts of New Mexico to deny it full faith and credit as required
under Art. IV, Section 1, U.S. Constitution. 1 10

For that reason, the court felt "constrained to give credence to the
Colorado adoption of Celia Thompson by Paul Delancy and [held]
that she is his lawful child." 111

2. Inheritance rights of an adopted child
While it is generally accepted that an adoption validly performed
in one state must be recognized in another, a different question is
whether the adopted individual will be entitled to an inheritance
under the laws of the forum state.m In In re Duke, 113 a New Jersey
court explained the "'stranger to the adoption' doctrine." 114 This
doctrine created "a presumption that an adopted child could not
take property under an instrument created by someone other than
the adoptive parent unless the instrument itself indicated a specific
intent that the adopted child should take." 115 Under such a rule, the
state would recognize the adoption from another state, whether of
an adult or of a minor, but would refuse to permit such an individual
to inherit unless, for example, the testator had expressly named that
person in the will as her beneficiary. 116
Many states no longer employ the stranger to the adoption
doctrine. 117 Now, states tend to treat the adoptive child and the

110. Delaney, 386 P.2d at 714.
Ill. Id.at715.
112. See, e.g., In re Estate of fenton, 901 A.2d 455, 465 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2006) ("While New Jersey law governs the validity of the adoptions in this case, 'the legal
incidents and effects of that status [adoption] with respect to property,' are 'determined by the
laws of' the state where the property has its situs." (quoting In re Estate of Griswold, 354 A.2d
717,720 (Morris County Ct. 1976))).
113. 702 A.2d 1008 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1995).
114. Id. at 1017.
115. Id.
116. In New Jersey, although the stranger to the adoption doctrine is no longer
applicable to individuals adopted as children, .<ee In re Trust Under Agreement of Vander Poe!,
933 A.2d 628, 635 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007), it is still applicable to adults. Sec id. ,lt
635~36.

117. Hallie E. Still-Caris, Note, Le._qi.<lative Reji~rm: Redejininlf the Parent-Child
Relationship in Ca.<es of Adoption, 71 IOWA L. REv. 265, 285 ( 1985) ("[T]he stranger to the
adoption doctrine was recently rejected in many jurisdictions .... ").
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biological child interchangeably.tts for example, many states refuse
to treat adopted children any differently for purposes of intestacy. 119
However, a court seeking to interpret a will must as an initial matter
discern the intent of the testator, 120 and some states presume that a
testator would not intend to leave an inheritance to an adult who is
adopted after the death of the testator.t 21
For example, suppose that an individual, Roberta Rich, sets up a
trust providing that her children, Sam and Terry, will receive the net
income from the trust. Upon their deaths, this trust will terminate
and be distributed to Sam and Terry's lineal descendants.m Now,
suppose that Roberta dies and then Terry gives birth to two children,
Vera and Wayne. Sam has no biological children but a few years after
Roberta's death Sam adopts Yolanda, who is an adult at the time of
the adoption. Then, a few years later, both Terry and Sam die. The
question is whether Yolanda will be entitled to a share of the
distributed assets.
In Commerce Bank v. Blasdel, 123 a Missouri appellate court
answered a similar question in the affirmative based on state law.
Missouri's law did not distinguish between biological and adopted
children, considering both to be descendants. 124 It did not

II X. Malinda L. Seymore, International Adoption & International Comity: When Is
Adoptirm "RcpUff1tant"?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 381, 382 (2004) ("Adopted children are
tre.ned identically to biological children for purposes of inheritance.").
119. fleet Nat'! Bank v. Hunt, No. 02·6899, 2005 WL 742663, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Mar. 9, 2005 ), ajj'd, 944 A.2d 846 (R.I. 200X) ("IT]he majority of jurisdictions recognize
adult adopted children .1s enjoying the same rights under the laws of intestacy as natural·born
children.").
120. In rc Estate of Griswold, 354 A.2d 717, 719 (Morris County Ct. 1976) ("The
primary objective is to ascertain the probable intention of the testator.").
121. Fleet Nat'! Rank, 2005 WL 742663, at *4 ("Section 15·7·16(a) clearly provides
that adoptccs arc entitled to the same inheritance rights as natural born children. The only
exception to this rule is that in the construction of any instrument, a child over the age of
eighteen \Tars old will not be treated as an heir·at·law if he/she was adopted subsequent to the
death oft he maker of the instrument.").
122. Sec Commerce Bank v. Blasdel, 141 S.W.3d 434, 440 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) ("The
inter vivos trust instrument also directed that the trust was to terminate when the seniors and
their sons had all died. On termination of the trust, its corpus, including all accrued and
undistributed income, was to 'be divided among and paid in equal shares, per stirpes, to the
lineal descendants then living .... "')(citation omitted).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 446; sec also, Clf., N.C. GE:-.i. STAT.§ 29·17(a), (c) (2008) (stating that an
adopti\T child (and any heirs of that child) will be treated as if the adopted child had been the
biological, legitimate child of the adoptive parents); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 109.050 (West
200X) ("An adopted child bears the same relation to adoptive parents and their kindred in
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distinguish between adopted children and adopted adults either. 125
Other states treat child and adult adoptees differently. 126 For
example, some states presume that the testator would have intended
to benefit a child but not an adult adoptee, 127 or they suggest that

every respect pertaining to the relation of parent and child as the adopted child would if the
adopted child were the natural child of such parents."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-104
(2007) ("When a decree of adoption becomes final: . . (2) the adoptee is the child, heir, or
issue of the adoptive parent for the purposes of interpretation or construction of a donative
disposition in any instrument, whether executed before or after an adoption, unless the
instrument npressly states a contrary intention or excludes the adoptee by name or by
classification not based on a family or parent and child relationship.").
125. Blasdel, 141 S.W.3d at 446 ("In enacting § 9614, RSMo 1939, the General
Assembly declared the law of Missouri to be that trom the date of their adoption forward,
adoptees were to be considered, for every purpose, exactly as if they were the legitimate, natural·
born children of their adoptive parents .... "); see also In re Estate of Brittin, 664 N.E.2d 687,
690 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) ("A careful review of the Adoption Act reveals no statutory
distinction between an adopted adult and an adopted minor with respect to the nature of the
legal relationship created between the adoptee and the adopting parent, namely, a parent-child
relationship. The adoptee, regardless of his age upon adoption, attains the status of a natural
child of the adopting parents.").
126. See, eg., TENN. CODE. A}.IN. § 36·1·121(c) (2008).
In the construction of any instrument, whether will, deed, or otherwise, whether
executed before or after August 24, I995, and whether the testator or other party
creating an interest by such instrument died before or after August 24, 1995, or
bctixe or after an adoption, a child so adopted and the descendants of such child are
deemed included within the class created by any limitation contained in such
instrument restricting a devise, bequest or conveyance to the lawti.ll heirs, issue,
children, descendants, or the like, as the case may be, of the adoptive parent, or of
an ancestor or descendant of one ( 1) of them, and such adopted child shall be
treated as a member of such class unless a contrary intention clearly shall appear by
the terms of such instrument or unless the particular estate so limited shall have
vested in interest and in possession in and as to the person or persons entitled
thereto on August 24, 1995; provided, that this sentence shall not apply in the
construction of any instrument as to any child who is over twenty-one (2I) years of
age at the time of such child's adoption.

I d.
127. See, eg., In re Estate of Nicol, 377 A.2d 120I, 1207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977) ("The distinction between adopted children and adopted adults is by no means an idle
one in the search f(,r the probable intent of a testator. It is one thing to ascribe to a testator a
contemplation of the possibility of that which has come to be relatively commonplace, namely,
the adoption of a child at some time in the future by a member of the family or other relative,
or any other prospective beneficiary under a will. Frequently, in such cases, the child is
acquired in infancy, although the child may be older where a spouse adopts a stepchild. In
both instances, however, the child is reared as one's own by the adopting parent and is
recognized as such among the family and friends."); id. at 1207-08 ("It is extremely unlikclv
that a testator would foresee the likelihood that his or her child, or any other prospective
beneficiary, might at some time in the ti.1ture adopt an adult. It is equally improbable that an
adopted adult would be embraced in the bosom of the family members other than the
adopting parent, as would an adopted child.").
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the adoption statute must be construed differently when an adult
adoptee seeks to inherit. 128
To complicate matters even more, a different issue is whether
one individual is adopting another as a way of thwarting the
testator's will. 129 Some states will try to discern whether an adoption
was performed to circumvent the wishes of a testator, 130 whereas
other states refuse to investigate the adopter's intentions. 131 Thus,
depending upon the jurisdiction, a court might suggest that even if
an adult adoptee could inherit from a grandmother as a general
matter, the adoptee seeking to inherit in the case before the court
would be precluded from receiving any proceeds from the estate
because the adopter and the adoptee had clearly been trying to
subvert the wishes of the adopter's mother. There might be ample
evidence, for example, that the adopter's mother had hated the
adoptee and had stated several times that she would never give the
adoptee a dime. 132
The forum state can apply local law when determining the effect
of an adoption. Whether an individual who is adopted as an adult is
entitled to be treated in the same way as an individual who was
adopted as a child is an issue for the state to determine under its own
law. Yet, the fact that a state can give full faith and credit to an
128. See, e.g., first Nat'! Bank v. Mott, 133 So. 78, 79 (Fla. 1931) ("[T]he statute does
not contemplate the adoption of an adult married woman by persons so that she 'shall be
considered the heir' of such persons, and 'entitled to inherit according to the laws of
Florida'"); In re Nowels Estate, 339 N.W.2d 861, 866 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) ("The
presumption created in ... M.S.A. § 27.5128 does not operate in favor of an adult adoptee
where an examination of all attendant circumstances indicates that the probable intent of the
testator or settlor was not to include the adult adoptee as a beneficiary.").
129. See, e.g., In re Estate of Griswold, 354 A.2d 717, 719~720 (Morris County Ct.
1976) ("The four surviving children of Alfred Whitney Griswold, who would take the
remainder unless Dyke takes, contend that ... the adoption of Dyke was for the purpose of
defeating a testamentary disposition and is a fraud as a matter of law.").
130. See, e.g., Cross v. Cross, 532 N.E.2d 486, 488~89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (suggesting
that adult adoptions should not be permitted to undermine a settlor's intentions); see also id. at
488 ("Mary was aware of defendant's 17-year residence with her son and could have made him
a permitted appointee, or provided for him separately in the trust. She chose not to do so, even
though she twice amended the trust.").
131. Sec, e.g., In re Estate of Fenton, 901 A.2d 455, 465 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2006) (citing Bridges v. Nicely, 497 A.2d 142, 147 (Md. 1985) ("[U]nder Maryland law,
parties arc not allowed to scrutinize the motives tor an adoption in determining the disposition
of trust estates.").
132. See, e.g., In re Estate of Martin, 635 N.W.2d 473, 475 (S.D. 2001) ("Marilyn
Thorson testified that before writing the will Leslie told her that she wanted Ann's children to
have her land and, 'Ann gets everything else and those other girls are not to get a dime."').
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adoption from another state but nonetheless limit the effects of the
adoption suggests an area in which there may be further litigation.
Suppose that Oklahoma had passed a law atlording fewer benefits
to a child adopted by a same-sex couple than would be atlorded to a
child adopted by a different-sex couple by classifYing the child as an
heir to only one rather than both of her parents. The state's decision
to discriminate among adoptees in this way might well be struck
down as unconstitutional because it is not rationally related to the
promotion of a legitimate state interest. After all, it is not clear how
anyone would benefit by imposing disadvantages on those adopted
by same-sex couples. Nonetheless, the state might try to justifY such
a law by appealing to moral concerns, although as Justice O'Connor
suggested in her concurrence in Lawrence Ji. Texas, 133 "moral
disapproval of this group [those with a same-sex orientation], like a
bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insutlicient to
satisfY rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause." 134
Thus, a state's appealing to morality to justifY its imposing a burden
on the children adopted by same-sex couples or even on the samesex adopters might be rejected even under rational basis review. On
the other hand, were a very deferential rational basis review
employed when examining such a law, the statute might be
upheld. 135

III. JURISDICTION TO MAKE CUSTODY AND VISITATION DECIS!O;-\S
State and federal courts have made clear that other states' final
adoptions must be given full faith and credit. Visitation and custody
decisions are more complicated, however, because such judgments
are subject to modification should the child's interest so require. 136
Because the Pull Faith and Credit Clause only requires sister states to
give a judgment the same credit that it would be given in the issuing

133. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
134. !d. at 582 (O'Connor,) .. concurring) (citing U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528,534 (1973)).
135. See, Cif., Williamson v. Lee Optical ofOkb., 348 U.S. 483,487-88 (1955) ("But
the law need not he in cverv respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is
enough that there is an evil at hand f(lr correction, and that it might be thought th,n the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.").
136. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180 ( 1988) ("[ Clustodv orders
characteristically arc subject to modification as required by the best interests of the child.").
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state, 137 a judgment that is modifiable in the issuing state can be
modified by another state without ofiending full faith and credit
guarantees_ux Historically, parents who were dissatisfied with a
court's custody decision in one forum would sometimes take the
child and retry the case in another forum, especially if the latter
t(>rum had a somewhat different analysis of what promoted a child's
best interests. 139 To prevent parents from taking their children to a
different jurisdiction to retry custody issues, 14° Congress passed the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA). 141

A. The Applicability of the PKPA
The PKPA was passed to lend support to the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), which specified the conditions
under which a state would have jurisdiction to decide custody and
visitation issues. 142 At issue in Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins 143 was
whether Vermont rather than Virginia had jurisdiction to award
custodial and visitation rights in a case in which two women were
dissolving their civil union. Lisa and Janet had lived together for
several years in Virginia in the late 1990s. 144 In December 2000, they
traveled to Vermont and entered into a civil union. 145 In 2001, Lisa
was artificially inseminated, and in 2002 Lisa gave birth to IMJ. 146
Lisa, Janet, and the child lived together for another four months in

137. !d. ("[T]he l'ull faith and Credit Clause obliges States only to accord the same
t(H-cc to judgmenrs as would be accorded by the courts of the State in which the judgment was
entered.").

13X. !d. ("Because courts entering custody orders generally retain the power to modifY
them, courts in other Stares were no less entitled to change the terms of custody according to
their own views of the child's best interest.").
139. !d. ("[A] parent who lost a custody battle in one State had an incentive to kidnap
the child .md move to another State to relitigate the issue.").
140. !d. at lXI ("[T]he principal problem Congress was seeking to remedy [by passing
the PKPA I was the inapplic1bility of full faith and credit requirements to custody
determinations.").
141. 2X US.C:. § 173XA (2007).
142. 17Jompsrm, 4X4 U.S. at lXI ("The sponsors and supporters of the Act conrinually
indicated that the purpose of the PKPA was to provide f(,r nationwide enforcement of custody
orders made in accordance with the terms of the UCC)A.").
143. 912 A.2d 9SI (Vt. 2006).
144. !d. <lt 956.
145. Jd.
146. !d.
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Virginia and then moved to Vermont in August 2002. 147 In the tall
of 2003, Lisa and Janet decided to separate, and Lisa moved to
Virginia with IMJ. 148 In November 2003, Lisa filed a petition to
dissolve the civil union in Vermont. 149 The family court issued a
temporary order regarding parental rights and responsibilities in June
2004, awarding Lisa legal and physical custody and Janet parentchild contact for one week per month and three weekends during
the summer. 150 The court also required Lisa to permit Janet a
telephone call with IMJ once each day. 151
Lisa did not permit Janet to have any parent-child contact with
IMJ after the first court-ordered parent-child contact weekend. 152
On July 1, 2004, Lisa filed a petition in Virginia asking the court to
establish IMJ's parentage. 153 Apprised of Lisa's having filed
elsewhere, the Vermont court reaffirmed its custody order 154 and
suggested that Lisa's refusal to abide by it would result in a hearing
regarding whether her parental rights and responsibilities needed to
be reallocated. 155
On September 2, 2004, the Vermont court found Lisa in
contempt for her failure to comply with the visitation order. 156 One
week later, the Virginia court said that all claims to parentage by
Janet were based on a Vermont law that was considered null and
void in Virginia. 157 Subsequently, Janet appealed that decision to the
Virginia Court ofAppeals. 158
In November 2004, the Vermont court f(llmd that both Lisa and
Janet had parental rights, and in December held that the Virginia
decision regarding Janet's parental rights was not entitled to full faith
and credit. Lisa appealed both decisions. 15 '~

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
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Id.
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I d.
Id. at 957.
I d.
I d.
I d.
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When analyzing the merits of Lisa's challenges on appeal, the
Vermont Supreme Court suggested that the case basically involved
"an interstate jurisdictional dispute over visitation with a child," 160
which is governed by the PKPA. The Vermont Supreme Court
noted that because Vermont was the child's home state, the
Vermont trial court had jurisdiction under both the PKPA and local
law. 161 Because Vermont had rightly exercised jurisdiction, the
Virginia court was precluded from exercising jurisdiction unless
Vermont had somehow lost its jurisdiction. 162 But Vermont had
never lost its jurisdiction. The state continued to have jurisdiction
under local law because IMJ recently had been living in Vermont
and because evidence of IMJ's relationship with Janet remained in
Vermont. 163 Vermont also continued to have jurisdiction under the
PKPA because one of the contestants, Janet, had remained a resident
of the statc. 164 Thus, because the Vermont court had exercised
jurisdiction consistent with the PKPA-which meant that the
Virginia court should not have exercised jurisdiction 165-the Virginia
decision had not comported with the PKPA and was not due full
faith and credit. 166
In her appeal, Lisa argued that the PKPA was inapplicable
because the issue bd(xe the court was a parentage action rather than
an action f()r custody or visitation. 167 The Vermont Supreme Court
rejected Lisa's contention, noting that the Virginia court had issued
a permanent order that Janet had no right of visitation/ 68 and
concluding that, "[p ]lainly, the Virginia court decisions included
visitation determinations as the term is ddincd in the PKPA. Just as
plainly, the PKPA applied to those decisions." 169
Even if the court had accepted Lisa's contention that the PKPA
docs not apply to parentage actions, the court suggested that it
160.
161.
162.
163.

!d.
/d ..1t'ISR.
!d. al '!59.
!d.
164. !d.
165. !d. at '157.
166. !d.
167. Sccid.at959.
16H. !d. •lt '160.
16'1. !d.; sec also In rr E.H.H., 16 P.3d 1257, 125'1 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) ("[U]ndcr the
PKPA, a termination of parental rights unavoidably worh a modification of prior custodv and
\'isit~ltion dctcrn1inc1tions. '').
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would not have given full faith and credit to the Virginia order. 170
The court reasoned that to suggest that full faith and credit required
such a result would be to suggest that "full faith and credit requires
the Vermont court to strike its own visitation order because the
Virginia court refuses to recognize its validity based entirely on
Virginia law." 171 Thus, Lisa's theory would require that Vermont not
recognize a valid order issued by a Vermont court so that the state
could give full faith and credit to a subsequent order by a Virginia
court.
This was not the first time that the Vermont Supreme Court had
been asked to ignore an order issued by a lower Vermont court in
accord with Vermont law so that an order from a court in another
state might be credited. The Vermont Supreme Court had already
held that Vermont "would not extend full faith and credit to another
state's custody determination if that state's court refused to extend
full faith and credit to an earlier Vermont custody order." 172
Basically, the court reasoned that Vermont would not give "greater
faith and credit to the judgments of the courts of other states" 173
than it would give to the judgments of its own courts. Here, where
the Vermont court had had jurisdiction to issue the initial order,
where the order was clearly valid in light of local law, and where the
Vermont court had retained jurisdiction, there was no justification
f(x giving credit to the order from the Virginia court rather than the
order from the Vermont court.

B. Application ofDOMA and the Treatment ofSame-Sex Uniom as
Marriages
In offering its analysis, the Vermont Supreme Court mentioned,
but then sidestepped, an issue raised by Lisa, who argued that the

170. Miller-jenkim, 912 A.2d at 959 ("first, she argues that the Virginia proceeding is a
parentage action, and the PKPA docs not apply to parentage actions. Even if we were to accept
this argument, we do not understand how it would determine the question bd(Jre us~that is,
whether the Vermont court must give full faith and credit to the Virginia parentage
decision.,').

171. I d. (emphasis added).
172. !d. (citing holding t(mnd in Medveskas v. Karparis, 640 A.2d S43, S46-47 (Vt.
1994)).
173. I d. at 959-60 (citing McdJJe.rkas, 640 A.2d at 546 ).
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Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 174 moditled the PKPA. 175 The
relevant provision of DOMA reads:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
trite, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim ansmg from such
relationship. 176
Lisa had argued that Janet was a parent by virtue of the civil
union into which she and Lisa had entered. 177 Lisa then suggested
both that the Virginia court was authorized by DOMA to refuse to
give effect to the Vermont judgment and that Vermont was required
to give full faith and credit to the Virginia judgment. 178 In effect,
Lisa argued that DOMA rendered the Vermont judgment void,
which made the Virginia judgment the initial custody and visitation
determination entitled to full faith and credit.
There are several reasons why Lisa's position does not accurately
reflect the law. First, as the Vermont Supreme Court pointed out,
DOMA's "purpose is to provide an authorization not to give full
faith and credit in the circumstances covered by the statute." 179 This
means that DOMA did not nullifY the Vermont order. Rather,
DOMA merely permits a state whose public policy precludes
enforcement of the order to refrain from giving that order full faith
and credit. Because the Vermont order was in accord with Vermont's
public policy, DOMA would neither require nor authorize Vermont
to refuse to enforce an order that was in accord with local policy.
Second, Lisa's interpretation of congressional intent is not
plausible. She suggested that the PKPA, which was passed in

174. 28 U.S.C. § l738C (2000).
175. See Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 961.
176. 28 U.S.C. § l738C.
177. Miller-[e1tkim, 912 A.2d at 961 ("[A] Vermont civil union is a relationship between
persom of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under Vermont law and that janet's right
of visitation, if any, arises trom that relationship.").
178. !d. at 961 ("DOMA authorized the Virginia court to reject any right of visitation
based on the Vermont court order, and the Vermont court must give full taith and credit to
the Virginia order.").
179. !d. at 962.
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1980/ 80 was amended by DOMA, which was passed in 1996. 181 Yet,
if that had been Congress's intent, one would have expected
Congress to say so expressly. 182 Not only did Congress fail to say so
expressly, but there is no discussion of the eftect of DOMA on child
custody or visitation in the Congressional Record. 183 Thus, there is
no evidence that it was Congress's intent to modifY the PKPA when
it passed DOMA, 184 even bracketing the presumption against reading
an implicit repeal into a statute. 18 '
Suppose, however, that one were to reject the importance of the
absence of such evidence and one were to offer the implausible
suggestion that the express language of DOMA is so clear on this
point that no other interpretation is possible. 186 Ironically, that same
kind of analysis might be used to defeat the claim that DOMA
modified the PKPA because the PKPA was itself modified after
DOMA.

180. Sec Social Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § X(a ).
181. See Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. I 04-199.
182. N.Y. Tel. Co. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519,566 n.22 (1979) ("This
Court has often stated that implied repeals and modifications of st.ltutes bv subsequent
congressional enactments arc justitied only when the two statures arc otherwise
irreconcilable."); United States v. Madigan, 300 U.S. 500, 506 ( 1937) ("lMJodific.nion by
implication of the settled construction of an earlier and dittcrent section is not fn·ored." ).
183. The closest members of Congress came to considering custodv cmd visit.Hion issues
was in their mentioning that Congress had also used its powers under the hdl l:'c1ith .md Credit
Clause to pass the PKPA. See 142 CONG. REC. H7274 ( 1996) (statement of Rep. Campbell)
(July 11, 1996) ("In 1980 the Congress adopted section 173:-l(a) of title 2X, which prm·idcd
that 'Whereas child custody determinations made bv the State where the divorce took place
generally are applied in all other States, not so if the couple moved ro another State.' And
Congress said that the second State did not have to abide by the child custody determinations
of the first State where the couple moved to the second State, an explicit usc of this second
sentence of article 5, section 1, power in the Congress. Then most recent!\·, in 1994, in section
1738(b) of the same title, Congress once again established that rule for child support orders.
We have, thus, a rather clear example of power explicitly in the Constitution, recognized by
treaties, and used as recently as last year.").
184. See Miller~ Jenkins v. Miller~ Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 337 (Va. Ct. App. 2006)
("Nothing in the wording or the legislative history of DOMA indicates that it was designed to
attect the PKPA and related custody and visitation determinations.").
185. See id. at 336 ("[A]ny Congressional intent to repeal [the PKPA by enacting
DOMA] must be by implication. However, '[ r ]epeal by implication is not favored and the
firmly established principle of law is that where two statutes are in apparent conflict, it is the
duty of the court, if it be reasonably possible, to give to them such a construction as will give
force and effect to each."' (quoting Scott v. Lichford, 180 S.E. 393,394 (Va. 1935))).
186. But see id. ("Lisa cites no authority holding that either the plain wording of DOMA
or its legislative history was intended to affect or partially repeal the PKPA.").
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If one reads the PKPA as having been modified by DOMA, the
modified PKPA version would presumably have said that the
"appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its
terms, and shall not modifY ... any custody determination ... made
consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another
State." 1B7 However, this version would be read to have an exception,
specifYing that if a custody decision were made based on the rights
arising from a same-sex relationship that was treated like a marriage
under another state's law, custody decisions would not have to be
enf(xced if doing so would violate an important public policy of the
forum state.
Yet, the PKPA was modified in 1998-two years after DOMA
had been passed. Rather than include the exception allegedly created
by DOMA, Congress instead reinf()[ced the limitations imposed by
the PKP A. The PKP A was modified to say that "appropriate
authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and
shall not modifY . . . any custody determination or visitation
determination made consistently with the provisions of this section
by a court of another State." 188 The amended version did not include

IX7. Sa 2X U.S.C:. § 173XA(a) (2000). The current PKPA specitlcs that the "appropriate
.luthorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modifY ... any
custodv determination or visitation determination made consistently with the provisions of this
section by a court of another State." There arc exceptions to this rule which arc not applicable
here.
lXX. See 2X U.S.C. § 173XA(a). Additional exceptions were added, none of which are
applicable here. The exceptions currently are:
(f) A court of a State may modifY a determination of the custody of the same child
made by a court of another State, if( I) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to
exercise such jurisdiction to modifY such determination.
(g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody
or visitation determination commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a
court of another State where such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction
consistently with the provisions of this section to make a custody or visitation
determination.
(h) A court of a State may not modifY a visitation determination made by a court of
another State unless the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction to modifY
such determination or has declined to exercise jurisdiction to modifY such
determination.
Id. Prior to the 1998 amendment, the only exception had been (f). See Pub. L. No. 105-374
("Section 1738A(a) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking 'subsection (f) of
this section, any child custody determination' and inserting 'subsections (f), (g), and (h) of this
section, any custody determination or visitation determination."').
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an exception f()r custody or visitation rights arising from a same-sex
relationship that was treated as a marriage under local law. Instead,
the amended version of the PKPA spoke to all custody and visitation
decisions, whether involving the parental rights and duties of parents
of the same sex or of different sexes. Thus, if one were to read the
PKPA as having been implicitly amended by DOMA in 1996, one
would presumably have to read the implicitly amended PKPA of
1996 as having itself been implicitly amended in 1998 in a way that
deleted the implicit DOMA exception.
The PKPA determines which state has jurisdiction to decide
parental rights and responsibilities. 189 Basically, under the PKP A,

189. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (2008).
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall ent(,rce according to its terms,
and shall not modifY except as provided in subsections (f), (g), and (h) of this
section, any custody determination or visitation determination made consistently
with the provisions of this section by a court of another State ..
(c) A child custody or visitation determination made by a court of a State is
consistent with the provisions of this section only if( 1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and
(2) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home
State within six months before the date of the commencement of the
proceeding and the child is absent from such State because of his removal
or retention by a contestant or for other reasons, and a contestant
continues to live in such State;
(B) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under
subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that a court
of such State assume jurisdiction because (I) the child and his parents, or
the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with
such State other than mere physical presence in such State, and (II) there
is available in such State substantial evidence concerning the child's
present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
(C) the child is physically present in such State and (i) the child has been
abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child
because the child, a sibling, or parent of the child has been subjected to
or threatened with mistreatment or abuse;
(D) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State has declined to
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the State whose jurisdiction is in
issue is the more appropriate t()rum to determine the custodv or visitation
of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that such court
assume jurisdiction; or
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of
this section.
(d) The jurisdiction of a court oL1 State which has made a child custody or visitation
determination consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long .1s

1842

1809]

Interstate Recolrnition ofAdoptions

Virginia was told that a Vermont rather than a Virginia court should
decide who has custody and visitation rights. Ironically, even if Lisa
were correct that Virginia was not required to give full faith and
credit to the Vermont order, Virginia still would not have had
jurisdiction to modifY the order. Virginia was not the child's home
state and none of the exceptions affording jurisdiction to Virginia
was triggered. 190 Thus, as the Virginia appellate court recognized,
Virginia simply did not have jurisdiction to make a custody or
visitation decision under the PKPA. 191
C. The Ejj'ects offurisdictionallssues on Same-Sex Families
Virginia's having the power to refuse to enf(xce the Vermont
order would not also have entailed that Virginia had the power to
modifY visitation. Thus, suppose that Janet had gone to Virginia to
enforce her visitation rights. Were Lisa's interpretation of the PKPA
as amended by DOMA accurate, Virginia would not have had to
enforce the Vermont visitation decree, assuming that Janet's parental
rights arose solely by virtue of a same-sex relationship that was
treated by Vermont as a marriage. But just because Virginia was not
required to enforce the rights arising from the civil union \Vould not
mean Virginia had jurisdiction to modifY the order. The Vermont
order would still stand and would still be enforceable in a state
whose public policy did not preclude its enforcement.
Vermont's refusal to "give 'greater faith and credit' to another
state's judgment that [was] in conflict with a valid judgment of [its]
own courts" 1n involved, as the Vermont Supreme Court itself noted,
a "narrow ground" 1n upon which to affirm the Vermont trial court.
Left for another day was "the broader question of whether DOMA,

the requirement of subsection (e)( I) of this section continues to be met and such
State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant.

I d.
190. Sec id. (c)(2)(B)-(c)(2)(D).
191. Sec Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 332 ("We hold that the trial court erred in f:1iling
to recognize that the l'KPA barred its exercise of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we vacate the

orders of the trial court and remand this case with instruction to grant full E1ith and credit to
the custody and \"isitation orders of the Vermont court.").
192. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-jenkins, 912 A.2d 951,962 (Vt. 2006).
193. Id.
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and not the PKPA, governs to determine the effect of a Vermont
custody or visitation decision based on a civil union. " 194
While expressly reserving that question for another day, dicta in
the Vermont Supreme Court's opinion indicated how that question
should be resolved. For example, the court noted the bad public
policy implications of Lisa's position. If Lisa's explication of the law
was accurate, a "Vermont biological parent of a child born to a civil
union could always move to another state to make a visitation order
unenforceable." 195 But this is exactly what the PKPA was designed to
avoid, namely, to prevent parents who disagreed with a visitation or
custody decision of one court to take the child to another state to relitigate the case in hopes that the new forum's public policy would
yield a more desirable result.
If a court were to hold that the PKPA must be interpreted in
light of DOMA, any benefits arising by virtue of a same-sex
relationship, treated as a marriage under the laws ofVermont, would
not have to be recognized in a state if such recognition would violate
the state's public policy. However, it is important to understand the
limitation allegedly imposed by DOMA. That Act does not suggest
that parental rights of the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender)
community can be ignored as a general matter. Rather, a sister state
can only ignore those benefits or rights that are conferred by virtue
of a same-sex relationship that is treated like a marriage by another
state.
Were the PKPA modified by DOMA, it would be necessary to
determine whether a Vermont civil union qualifies as "a same-sex
relationship that is treated like a marriage" under Vermont law.
Vermont law makes clear that civil unions 196 are not marriages 197 and
thus, arguably, civil unions are not treated as marriages under local
law. If that it so, then Vermont civil unions would not seem to
trigger the DOMA exception.

I

I
I
\

I
\
\

I

\

l
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (2002) ("For a civil union to be established in
Vermont, it shall be necessary that the parties to a civil union satisf}r all of the following criteria:
... (2) Be of the same sex and therefore excluded from the marriage laws of this state.").
197. See id. § 8 (2002) ("Marriage is the legally recognized union of one man and one
woman.").
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Of course, civil unions provide the same benefits as do
marriages. 198 Perhaps, then, they should be understood to be
sufficiently marriage-like so as to trigger DOMA. That would mean
the presumption of parentage created by a child's birth into a civil
union 199 would not have to be recognized by other states. 200
However, foreclosing the use of that avenue to establish
(presumptive) parenthood would not preclude the use of other
avenues by which the parent-child relationship could be
established. 201
for example, under Vermont law, an individual who is a nonmarital and non-civil union partner of a parent can adopt the
parent's child if the parent agrees, if the adoption is in the best
interest of the child, and if the adoption does not abridge the rights
of someone elsc. 202 Because the hypothesized DOMA exception to
the PKPA is only triggered if the rights or benefits are acquired by
virtue of a same-sex marriage-like relationship, DOMA would not be
triggered by a second -parent adoption. Thus, individuals in civil
unions could protect their parental rights by adopting the child born
into the union. 20 '

1</S. Id. § 1204 (a) (2002) ("Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits,
protections ,111d responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute, administrative or
court rule, policy, common law or anv other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a
m.1rriage.").
!</</. See Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at </66 ("[B]ccause Lisa gave birth through artificial
inscmin,nion, the presumption of parentage contained in § 308 applied to janet, just as it
would have applied to Lisa's husband if she had had one at the time of the birth").
200. See id. (discussing parentage presumption).
20 I. !d. at 969 ("Where the presumption cannot apply, it does not mean the individual is
not a parent; it simply means we must look to see whether parentage exists without the use of
the presumption.").
202. VT. STAT. AN:--:. tit. 15A, § 1-102 (b) (2002) ("If a family unit consists of a parent
and the parent's partner, and adoption is in the best interest of the child, the partner of a
parent mav adopt a child of the parent. Termination of the parent's parental rights is
unnecessary in an adoption under this subsection.").
203. See Mark Strasser, When Is a Parent Not a Parent? On DOMA, Civil Unions, and
Pn·sumptiom of Parenthood, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 299,300 (2001).
Civil union couples can take advantage of Vermont's second-parent adoption
provision, since the parental relationship would then have been established without
having relied on the legal recognition of a same-sex marriage or marriage-like
relationship. Although a second-parent adoption would require an investment of
resources that doubtless could otherwise be spent in a variety of worthwhile ways,
such an investment might nonetheless be a wise expenditure, preventing or reducing
the loss of many hours and dollars in possible future litigation, and significantly
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The Vermont Supreme Court recognized that fi:)rcing all ciYil
union couples to avail themselves of formal adoption procedures was
not what the Vermont Legislature intended/ 04 even though Lisa's
argument might appear to require that such adoptions take place. 20 "
Yet, Lisa's analysis does not account for another feature ofVermont
law by which Janet could establish her parental relationship with
IMJ. The Vermont Supreme Court noted that an individual who is
not formally a parent might nonetheless be recognized by the law as
being a child's parent under certain conditions. The court analyzed
Miller-jenkins in light of the following relevant factors:
It was the expectation and intent of both Lisa and Janet that Janet

would be IMJ's parent. Janet participated in the decision that Lisa
would be artificially inseminated to bear a child and participated
actively in the prenatal care and birth. Both Lisa and Janet treated
Janet as IMJ's parent during the time they resided together, and
Lisa identified Janet as a parent of IMJ in the dissolution petition.
Finally, there is no other claimant to the status of parent, and, as a
result, a negative decision would leave IMJ with only one parent. 206

The Vermont court reasoned that because so many factors
favored recognizing Janet's parent-child relationship with IMJ, there
was no need to decide which factors might be dispositive in a lessclear case. 207 However, it is important to understand just what the
court suggested. According to local law, Janet's relationship with
IMJ could be recognized by a court on a basis other than that Lisa
and Janet had been in a civil union, namely, that all of the described
factors applied. If that is true, then a sister state could not refuse to
enforce the Vermont trial court's recognition of the parent-child

reducing if not completely eliminating the likelihood of a different state refusing to
recognize the partner's parental status sometime in the future.

I d.
204. See Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 968. The disruption that would be caused by
requiring adoption of all children conceived by artificial insemination by non-biological parents
is particularly at variance with the legislative intent for civil unions. The Legislature's intent in
enacting the civil union laws was to create legal equality between relationships based on civil
unions and those based on marriage.
205. I d. ("The result of Lisa's statutory argument would be to produce separate bendits
and protections for couples in civil unions. Under her argument, no partner in .1 civil union
could be the parent of a child conceived by the other partner without t(Jrmally adopting that
child.").
206. Id. at 970.
207. Id. at 971.

1846

\

\
\
\

I

\

I

I

1809]

Interstate Recognition ofAdoptions

relationship and the prov1s1on of visitation rights, even if DOMA
modified the PKPA.
While aff()rding recogmtlon to functional parents in Vermont
would help Janet Miller-Jenkins, given that custody and visitation
rights were decided in Vermont, the limitations of that approach
should be made clear. First, the recognition of parental rights based
on ftmctional parenthood is a matter of state law and some
jurisdictions refl1se to award custody or visitation rights on that basis.
Just because such factors would provide an independent basis for
parenthood in Vermont would not mean they would provide such a
basis in another state. Second, because a state is not required to
substitute another state's law for its own/08 another state would not
be required to consider the factors enumerated by the Vermont
court in determining whether Janet was IMJ's parent if doing so
would be contrary to local public policy.
Suppose the hypothetical case of Adams v. Bright had the same
facts of Miller-Jenkins except this time Lisa Adams waited until after
she and her biological child had been living in a different state for
seven months and then filed there to determine the parental rights
and responsibilities of the different parties. 209 Suppose further that
the f()rum state did not recognize civil unions and did not recognize
functional parenthood as a basis for awarding custody or visitation
rights. Janet Bright might not even be awarded visitation rights,
possible harm to the child notwithstanding.
The above scenario has important implications for an individual
who might find herself in a position like Janet's, not least ofwhich is
that she might not be able to afford to risk having another
jurisdiction decide parental rights and responsibilities. This might
mean that an individual would feel forced to file to have parental
rights and responsibilities determined, which might further alienate a
partner and remove any chance of reconciliation.
Suppose Jan and Heather entered into a civil union in Vermont.
Jan subsequently gives birth to a child, Linda. Jan and Heather have
a serious disagreement and Jan decides that she wants to go live with

20X. See supm notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
20lJ. Cf Miller-Jenkins \'. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 338 (Va. Ct. App. 2006)
("The issue bd(n-c us is the narrow one of jurisdiction. By tiling her complaint in Vermont,
Lisa in\'Oked the jurisdiction of the courts of Vermont and subjected herself and the child to
that jurisdiction. The PKPA f(>rbids her prosecution of this action in the courts of this
Commomvcalth.").
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her sister for a time. She and Linda go to live with Jan's sister 111
Virginia.
Were Jan and Linda to stay in Virginia for a week or even a
month, there would not be a problem for purposes here. However, if
Jan stayed there for over half a year and then filed for a
determination of parental rights, Heather might be cut off from
Linda. Rather than allow time to elapse during which Heather and
Jan might work out their differences so that their relationship might
continue, the law builds in an incentive for Heather to file for a
determination of custody and visitation rights before Vermont loses
its home-state designation. This might make all of the parties worse
off than they would have been had this artificial incentive not been
present. Further, it should be noted, at issue here is not merely
whether one of the parents might be given an advantage such as an
increased likelihood of getting custody or a greater share of sharedparenting time, but rather whether Heather would even be
recognized as a parent.
An additional wrinkle might be added here. Suppose that
custody and visitation rights and responsibilities are awarded by a
Vermont court and the custodial parent wishes to relocate to another
state. Should the court take into account the law of the state where
the parent wishes to relocate?
Many courts deciding whether to permit a parent and child
relocation will consider whether the relationship between the child
and the noncustodial parent would suffer were the relocation request
granted. 21 ° For example, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld a
lower court's decision to modify custody rather than permit the
custodial parent to move with the children, because the lower court
had found that remaining in the state would be more likely to
preserve the noncustodial parent's relationship with the children.m

210. Sec, e.g., Graner v. Graner, 738 N.W.2d 9, 14 (N.D. 2007) (listing as one of the
considered factors "[ t ]he potential negative impact on the relationship between the
noncustodial parent and the child, including whether there is a realistic opportunity t(n·
visitation which can provide an adequate basis for preserving and tc>Stering the noncustodial
parent's relationship with the child if relocation is allowed, and the likelihood that each parent
will comply with such alternate visitation"); sec also Mason v. Coleman, 850 N.E.2d 513,
517 (Mass. 2006) (upholding a refusal to grant a relocation because "the move would cause a
reduction of the father's parenting time that would not be in the children's interests").
211. See Rogers v. Parrish, 923 A.2d 607, 611 (Vt. 2007) ("On balance, the court
concluded that an award of sole legal and physical rights and responsibilities to Elther was
'most likclv to preserve the children's relationship with both of their parents and aft(mi them
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Often, at least part of the analysis is focused on the willingness of
each parent to promote the relationship between the children and
the other parent. 212 If a parent seems unwilling to promote contact
between the child and the other parent, a court may be less willing
to permit the parent to relocate to another state for fear that the
non-custodial parent would no longer be able to have a relationship
with the child.
A different but related issue is whether the jurisdiction itself
would be likely to promote contact between the child and the
noncustodial parent. 213 Suppose, for example, that two individuals,
Alice and Bernice, had entered into and then dissolved a civil union
in Vermont. Bernice was awarded custody of her biological child,
Clara, while Alice was awarded liberal visitation rights with Clara,
whom she has adopted. Suppose Alice meets someone else, Donna,
and enters into a civil union with her. Alice and Donna frequently
see Clara and all seem to be getting along quite well.
Bernice receives a very attractive job offer in another state, and
seeks to relocate there with Clara. Suppose, however, that the new
state's case law incorporates a presumption that an individual who is
cohabiting with a non-marital partner has a bad moral influence on a
child and that courts should impose severe restrictions on visitation
while the non-custodial parent cohabits with a non-marital partner.
While the Vermont court had jurisdiction over custody and
visitation, the presumption against non-marital cohabitation would

the greatest amount of stability and security,' and therefore served the best interests of the
children.").
212. See, CB., ALASKA STAT.§ 25.24.150(c) (2006) ("The court shall determine custody
in accordance with the best interests of the child .... In determining the best interests of the
child the court shall consider ... ( 6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent and the child.")
213. Cf ALA. CODE§ 30-3-l69.3(a) (2007).
Upon the entry of a temporary order or upon final judgment permitting the change
of principal residence of a child, a court may consider a proposed change of principal
residence of a child as a factor to support a change of custody of the child. In
determining whether a proposed or actual change of principal residence of a minor
child should cause a change in custody of that child, a court shall take into account
all factors affecting the child, including, but not limited to, the following:
( 13) Whether or not the proposed new residence of a child is to a foreign country
whose public policy does not normally enfiJrcc the visitation rights of non-custodial
parents, which does not have an adequately fimctioning legal system, or which
otherwise presents a substantial risk of specific and serious harm to the child.
I d.
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not affect Alice's visitation rights. Thus, even were the relocation
request granted, Vermont law would govern visitation for some
time. However, if the new state was operating under the Unif(mn
Child Custody and Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), then it could exercise
jurisdiction to modify the visitation terms once the new state had
become the child's home state. 214 If the new state had a marriage
amendment similar to Virginia's that precluded recognition of a
same-sex relationship, 215 then Alice and Donna's civil union would
not be recognized and that relationship would simply be viewed as
non-marital cohabitation. 216 Because under state law Alice would be
viewed as cohabiting with a non-marital partner, her visitation rights
with Clara would be at risk of being severely limited under local law.
At least two points might be made about the example involving
Alice and Donna. First, state law might f()rcc Alice to choose
between living with Donna and having reasonable visitation with

214. Missouri is one of the few states not to have replaced the UCCJA with the Unif(m11
Child Custody and jurisdiction Enf(n·cement Act (UCCJEA). The UCC:JA would .1llo\\ the
new state to exercise jurisdiction to modi!)• the terms of visitation once the new st.lte \\·,1s the
child's home stare. Sec Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 452.450(1) (West 2007) ("A court of this st.ne
which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custmh·
determination by initial or modification decree if: (1) This state: (a) Is the home st.ne of the
child at the time of commencement of the proceeding .
.")
215. Sa VA. CollE ANN.§ 20-45.3 (2007).
A civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement between persons of the
same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or obligations of marri.rge is
prohibited. Anv such civil union, partnership contrc1ct or other arrangement entered
into lw persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all
respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created thereby shall be void and
unenf(>rceable.

I d.
216. q: Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (suggesting th.n the
state would not r~cognizc either a civil union or a san1c-scx n1arriagc as an exception to such a
rule). At issue in Burns was an agreement between the divorcing parents which precluded
visitation if the non-custodial parent was cohabiting with a non-relative. Sec id. at 48.
Darian and Susan Burns were divorced on December 4, 1995, and Darian rct.1ined
full custodv of the couple's three minor children. Three vears later Susan tiled .1
motion f(>r contempt, alleging that Darian refused to allow her visitation with the
children. As a result the court issued a consent order modifying visitation rights. The
modification required and the parties agreed that "[t Jhere shall be no visitation nor
residence by the children with either party during any time where such party
colubits with or has overnight stays with anv adult to which such p.1rty is not legally
married or to whom party is not related within the second degree.
It is not clear whether Susan Burns ti.:lt f(>rced to agree to this provision, e.g.,
bec,lllsc she knew that otherwise she would not be allowed to see her children.

Id.
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Clara, harm to all three of these parties by such a forced choice
notwithstanding. Second, a separate issue is whether the Vermont
court deciding whether to permit the relocation should consider that
such a relocation would put Alice at risk of having to choose
between living with Donna and having reasonable visitation with
Clara. While a state with an oflicial policy that same-sex relationships
should be viewed with distaste might believe it good public policy to
undermine such relationships, Vermont would not hold such a view.
Given that Vermont views a relocation request by a custodial parent
less favorably if the relocating custodial parent would be likely to
undermine the relationship between the child and the noncustodial
parent, perhaps the court should also consider whether the state to
which the individual wishes to relocate would make the relationship
between the child and the noncustodial parent too diflicult to
maintain.
One of the worries pointed to here is that the UCCJA gives the
child's home state jurisdiction to decide visitation matters, which
might mean that the relationship between the child and the
noncustodial pan:nt would be at risk if the child moved to a state
disapproving of same-sex relationships. That worry has been greatly
mitigated because most states have replaced the UCCJA with the
Unitl:m11 Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA). As the Colorado Supreme Court explains, the UCCJEA
includes certain improvements over the UCCJA including that "the
U CC J EA provides t()r exclusive continuing jurisdiction for the state
entering the initial custody decree," 217 as long as one of the parents
continues to live there. 21 s This means Clara's home state would not

217. People ex rd. A.) .C., 88 !'.3d 599, 609 (Colo. 2004 ).
218. Sa Miller-Jenkins\'. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 959 (Vr. 2006) (noting that
)a net h.1d rem.1ined in the state). Georgia has adopted the UCCJEA. See (;A. CODE A:--::--.:. §§
19-9-40 to 19-9-104 ( 2007). Certain conditions must be true if a Georgia court is to modit)• a
cw.todv or visitation decree ti·om another state. Sec GA. CODE Al'iN. § 19-9-63 (2007).
Except as otherwise prm·idcd in Code Section I Y-9-64 [temporary emergency
jurisdiction], ,\ court of this state may not modi!}· a child custody determination
lll<lde hv .1 court of .mother state unless a court of this state has jurisdiction to make
.1n initial determination under p.1ragraph (l) or (2) of subsection (a) of Code
Section I Y-9-61 and:
(I) The court of the other state determines it no longer has exclusive, c'ontinuing
jurisdiction . . or that .1 court of this state would be a more convenient forum
under Code Section 19-9-67; or
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be entitled to exercise jurisdiction and make use of that local
presumption to modifY visitation, assuming that Vermont did not
decide to decline to exercise its jurisdiction. However, that would
not prevent a related difficulty from arising.
Suppose Alice and Donna are considering whether to relocate to
the state where Clara now lives so they can be closer to her and have
more regular visitation. Such a move would not be without its risks
because by leaving the state Alice would no longer have the
protection of Vermont courts. Indeed, the same point might be
made even if Alice and Donna wanted to move to another state that
would recognize their civil union, 219 namely, they would lose the
protection of the Vermont court, and a court in the state where
Clara lived might severely limit Clara's visitation with Alice and
Donna. 220
It might be claimed that the same difficult calculation could be
imposed on a different-sex cohabiting couple deciding whether to
move to the state where a child lived or, perhaps, to some third state.
However, at least as a general matter, such couples are not precluded
from having their relationship recognized as a matter of law.
IV. CONCLUSION

The recent high-profile cases, Finstuen v. Crutche-l- 21 and MillerJenkins v. Miller-]enkins, 222 illustrate some of the difficulties same-sex
( 2) A court of this state or a court of the other state determines that neither the
child nor the child's parents or any person acting as a parent presently resides in the
other state.
Id.; see also Kathleen A. Hogan, Custody Jurisdiction, 26 FAM. Anvoc. 22, 26 (2004 ).
A keystone of the UCCJEA is that the original-decree state retains exclusive
continuing-jurisdiction to modifY its own custody and visitation orders unless and
until one of the following events occurs:
The child and both parents (or any person acting as a parent) no longer live in the
state or
The original-decree state decides that it no longer has significant connections with
the case.
I d.
219. See N.J. STAT. AN~. 26:8A-6(c) (2007) ("A domestic partnership, civil union or
reciprocal beneficiary relationship entered into outside of this State, which is valid under the
laws of the jurisdiction under which the partnership was created, shall be valid in this State.").
220. See Forman, supra note 44, at 7 ("Parents who have loved, nurtured, and supported
their children are at risk of being stripped of their parental rights should they move, and their
children are at risk of being completely cut off trom a parent to whom they arc deeply attached
and on whom they have depended.").
221. 496 F.3d 1139 (lOth Cir. 2007).
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parents and their children may face in the interstate context. While
the courts in both cases applied and reaffirmed existing law, there is
nonetheless reason to worry about the kinds of cases that are likely to
appear in the future. Finstuen reaffirms that final adoptions are
subject to full faith and credit guarantees, although questions remain
\Vith respect to what kinds of incidents might be reserved for
particular adoptees or adopters. The dueling cases involving the
Miller-Jenkins litigation suggest that the Defense of Marriage Act
does not modify the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act and thus
states will not be able to circumvent the existing system with respect
to which state has jurisdiction to decide custody and visitation
matters.
Yet, Miller-Jenkins would have been a much different case if
Virginia rather than Vermont had been the initial state determining
parental rights. Same-sex parents raising children are especially
vulnerable to some of the variations in local law, which may make
calculations about whether and where to file for a determination of
parental rights even more complicated than they are for other kinds
of families. Presumably, states should be creating incentives for
individuals to stay together rather than to file for dissolution of their
relationships. But a race to court might be the best way for an
individual to protect her custody or visitation rights should the
relationship come to an end.
The point here should not be misunderstood. The claim is not
that such individuals are acting selfishly by filing earlier than they
otherwise would have. On the contrary, filing early might be the best
\vay to promote the best interests of the child by protecting the
relationship between the child and the non-biological parent.
Indeed, where there is no ofilcial adoptive relationship between the
functional parent and the child she has been raising, there may be
great incentive to file and take advantage of the protections of local
law that might not exist in another jurisdiction. 223 The failure to take

222. Sec Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951; Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330
(Va. Ct. App. 2006).
223. See, Clf., Wakeman \'. Dixon, 921 So.2d 669, 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
("[Ujndcr Florida law, :tbscnt cYidcncc of detriment to the child, courts have no authority to
grant custody or to compel visitation by a person who is not a natural parent and that
agreements proYiding for Yisitation by a non-parent are unenforceable.").
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advantage of such protections might result in great opportunity costs
for both the non-official parent and the child. 224
That said, the kind of public policy forcing individuals to make
these kinds of choices serves no one's interests. Congress or the
courts must act to prevent states from imposing invidious burdens
on same-sex parents and their children, which only result in harm to
all concerned. At a time when many decry the break-up of the family
and the accompanying instability thereby imposed on innocent
children, states' placing extra burdens on such families is simply
unconscionable. All of our country's families deserve better
treatment than that.

224. See id. o.t 671 (VanNortwick, J., specially concurring) ("The number of children in
Florida raised in so-called non-traditional households, such as the Wakeman-Dixon household,
is increasing. I am concerned that, when those households dissolve, florida law ignores the
needs of those children. I write to urge the Florida I .cgislaturc to addre" tiK needs of the
children born into or raised in these non-traditional households when J break-up occurs.").
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